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THE ELDERLY WITH A DISABILITY:
SOCIAL SECURITY AND REPRESENTATIVE
PAYMENT
Michael J. Churgin*
Hundreds of thousands of elderly Social Security recipients
receive their monthly benefits indirectly.' As a result of a
determination by the Social Security Administration (SSA),
checks are sent to some other person (or entity) to use the funds
on the beneficiary's behalf.2 How that decision is made and the
selection process of the payee are the issues discussed in this
paper. For the elderly who live in an assisted living facility,
mental health facility, nursing home, or other group
environment, the situation of representative payment poses
special problems, especially when the facility is named as the
payee. (The Railroad Retirement Board and the Department of
Veterans Affairs have similar programs, but they are beyond the
scope of this paper.)3
* Michael J. Churgin, Raybourne Thompson Centennial Professor, University of
Texas School of Law. Barbara Bridges, the documents librarian of the Tarlton Law
Library, University of Texas School of Law, was of invaluable assistance in the
preparation of this article. An earlier version of this paper was presented at a
Marquette Law School conference, "The Convergence of Elder and Disability
Policy," on April 2, 2009. Professor Alison Barnes and the student editors were
wonderful hosts.
1. U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GUARDIANSHIPS: COLLABORATION
NEEDED TO PROTECT INCAPACITATED ELDERLY PEOPLE, REP. NO. GAO-04-655, at 7
(2004). The data are based on an age of sixty-five. Id.
2. See generally 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(j) (Westlaw through 2009 Pub L. 111-62).
3. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R § 266.1-266.13 (2009) (Railroad Retirement Board);
Department of Veterans Affairs' Fiduciary Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Benefits of the H. Comm. on Veterans' Affairs, 108th Cong. (2004).
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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Congress enacted the Social Security Act in 1935.4 The first
significant amendments to the program occurred in 1939, which
extended coverage to survivors and dependents;' among the
other provisions was an authorization for representative
payment.6 (In 1978, a long-time employee of the SSA told me
that when the program was created, the goal was to distribute
the funds, and there was no interest in how people might spend
the proceeds. It soon became apparent that some individuals
could not handle their funds appropriately, and it was up to the
SSA to decide what to do.) 7 As one official stated in testimony:
"[F]rom 1939 until well into the 1970's, we encountered very,
very few difficulties with our representative payee policies
because in the very large majority of these cases the normal
payee sources yielded suitable payees, such as close relatives,
friends, and so on."8 What once had been a short paragraph has
grown to many pages of statutory language in the United States
Code Annotated as Congress indicated its concern with the way
the representative payment program has operated.9 A few years
ago, Congress mandated an external study of the system, which
is the latest in a series of reports by various entities on the
program, including the now defunct Administrative Conference
of the United States, the SSA, and most recently, the National
4. Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935).
5. Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-379, §§ 201, 202(b)-
(f), 53 Stat. 1360, 1362-66 (1939).
6. Id. sec. 201, § 205(j), 53 Stat. 1360, 1371.
7. See, e.g., Use of Representative Payees in the Social Security and Supplemental
Security Income Programs: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Social Security and Subcomm.
on Human Resources of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 101st Cong. 40 (1989)
(statement of Louis D. Enoff, Deputy Comm'r for Programs, Social Security
Administration). There was litigation in the 1970's concerning the determination of
the need for representative payment as well as use of state officials as payees when
they also were creditors.
8. Id.
9. Compare Jordan v. Heckler, 744 F.2d 1397, 1398 (10th Cir. 1984) (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 405(j)) with 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(j) (Westlaw through 2009 Pub L. 111-62).
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Academy of Sciences. 0
DETERMINING COMPETENCY
The SSA has broad discretion to decide whether or not to pay
benefits to an individual directly." Even if an individual is
deemed capable of managing his or her own affairs under state
law, the federal government may decide that payment through a
representative payee is appropriate or the converse.12  The
decision to pay benefits to someone other than the direct
beneficiary can have a profound impact on one's life. Initially,
the SSA took the position that it really was of little consequence
since the representative payee would use the benefits for the
individual's best interest. 3 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit agreed: "The private interest affected in this
action is the free use of Social Security benefits. There is not a
termination of benefits ... but rather a deprivation of free use of
benefits."14 However, for the individual concerned, the decision
to stop benefits and to pay the proceeds to another can be
significant.' 5  It can affect feelings of self-worth, personal
autonomy-the ability to control one's own life choices.16 "The
10. Margaret G. Farrell, Report for Recommendation 91-3: The Social Security
Administration's Representative Payee Program: Problems in Administrative Paternalism,
in ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES RECOMMENDATIONS AND
REPORTS 263 (1991); SOC. SEC. ADMIN., FINAL REPORT OF THE REPRESENTATIVE
PAYMENT ADVISORY COMMITTEE (1996); COMM. ON SOC. SEC. REPRESENTATIVE
PAYEES, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS., IMPROVING THE SOCIAL
SECURITY REPRESENTATIVE PAYEE PROGRAM: SERVING BENEFICIARIES AND
MINIMIZING MISUSE (2007).
11. 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(j)(1)(A) (Westlaw through 2009 Pub L. 111-62).
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., Use of Representative Payees in the Social Security and Supplemental
Security Income Programs: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Social Security and Subcomm.
on Human Resources of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 101st Cong. 40 (1989)
(statement of Louis D. Enoff, Deputy Comm'r for Programs, Social Security
Administration).
14. McGrath v. Weinberger, 541 F.2d 249, 253 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 933 (1977).
15. See, e.g., Dale v. Hahn, 440 F.2d 633, 636 (2d Cir. 1971) (relating to a
challenge to a statutory declaration of incompetency based on admission to a
mental hospital).
16. See id.
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stigma of incompetency, the implication that she has some kind
of mental deficiency, with attendant untrustworthiness and
irresponsibility, and the consequences to her reputation and her
normal human relationships with others in her community
involve more than a property right."17  There is a rich and
growing literature about the importance of recognizing the
autonomy of the elderly,' and the lack of recognition of the
importance of managing one's own affairs was an unfortunate
failing of Social Security. As a leading review article states:
"Financial capacity comprises a broad range of conceptual,
pragmatic, and judgment abilities that are critical to the
independent functioning of adults in our society." 9
Some courts recognized the importance of competency. 20 In
a representative payee challenge in Connecticut in which I was
involved, the federal district court found that:
[T]he official determination that one is incapable of
managing benefit payments does implicate due process
rights because of the obvious "stigma of incompetency"
coupled with the fact that such a characterization leads
not just to some possible loss of reputation, but to a
significant "alteration of legal status" in depriving the
individual entitled to benefits of control over, and
direct use of his funds.2 1
During the pendency of these cases, the SSA first decided to give
advance notice to the beneficiary that representative payment
was being contemplated. 2 2 Action would be taken in ten days if
no protest was received. 23 Social Security fought expanded due
process protections for the beneficiary faced with representative
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Jennifer Moye & Daniel C. Marson, Assessment of Decision-Making
Capacity in Older Adults: An Emerging Area of Practice and Research, 62B J.
GERONTOLOGY: PSYCHOL. SC. 3 (2007).
19. Id. at 7.
20. Kennedy v. Secretary, No. N-74-220, [1977 - 1978 Transfer Binder] Unempl.
Ins. Rep. (CCH) 1115, 116 (D. Conn. 1977) [hereinafter Kennedy v. Secretary].
21. Id. (citations omitted).
22. McGrath, 541 F.2d at 251 n.3.
23. Id.
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payment,24 but later adopted changes and today, thirty years
later, an individual perusing the statute would note that
Congress has mandated advance notice along with information
about the right to appeal, review evidence, and submit
additional evidence. 2s
The SSA's Program Operations Manual System (known as
POMS) provides internal guidance for personnel in decision-
making.26  The POMS chapter devoted to representative
payment echoes the congressional mandate: "Deciding that a
beneficiary is incapable of managing or directing someone else
to manage his or her funds is one of the most important
decisions you will make. This decision deprives an individual of
fiscal independence and self-determination regarding how
benefits are spent."2 7 However, cutting in the other direction is a
highlighted admonition: "REMEMBER: In all payee actions, the
beneficiary's best interest must always be considered." 28 It is
quite conceivable that someone could handle the beneficiary's
claim check better than the individual, but that is beside the
point. The threshold question must be whether the person is
capable of managing his or her own benefits, not whether the
SSA personnel approve of how the money is spent or not.
There remain some significant issues concerning the
decision to resort to representative payment. The way in which
Social Security approaches the determination raises some flags
for concern, particularly for persons housed in group
environments. A key piece of evidence is the physician's
statement, a two-page form. 29 The current version of the form is
24. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Secretary; the federal district court's judgment in the
case anticipated the due process protections that Social Security and Congress
eventually provided; see Kennedy v. Califano, No. N-74-220 [1979 Transfer Binder]
Social Security Matters, Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) [ 16, 185 (D. Conn. 1978).
25. 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(j)(2)(E) (Westlaw through 2009 Pub L. 111-62).
26. Social Security Online Program Operations Manual System, Front Page,
https://secure.ssa.gov/appslO/poms.nsf/aboutpoms (last visited Oct. 25, 2009).
27. Id., Section GN 00502.010, https://secure.ssa.gov/appsl0/poms.nsf/Inx/02005
02010!opendocument (last visited Oct. 25, 2009).
28. Id.
29. Physicians/Medical Officer's Statement of Patient's Capability to Manage
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an improvement over that used previously. 0 The form today
asks whether "the patient is capable of managing or directing
the management of benefits in his or her own best interest."3' A
previous version of the form did not contain the phrase
"directing the management;" 32 in this day and age when
automatic bill payment can be arranged through a bank or credit
card, the "directing the management" language is a positive
step.3 The prior form also contained language warning that
being able to sign a check was not enough to indicate ability to
manage one's affairs;M this might have led to the evaluator
believing a high degree of competency was necessary.35
Unfortunately, some key language is not on the same side of the
form as is the place where the physician indicates an opinion:
"However, even though a person may need some assistance
with such things as bill paying, etc., does not necessarily mean
he/she cannot make decisions concerning basic needs and is
Benefits, Form SSA-787 (02-2009) (on file with author) [hereinafter Form SSA-787].
30. See Kennedy v. Secretary ("The only directly adverse opinion consisted of a
'no' box checked off by a state hospital psychiatrist on a Social Security form
inquiry [SSA-787], 'in your opinion, is the patient able to manage benefit payments
in his (her) own interests....'); see also Letter from James E. Forbus, Acting Director
Bureau of Retirement and Survivors Insurance, to author (June 17, 1975) (on file
with author) [hereinafter Letter from James E. Forbus]. The letter explains:
During the years 1973 and 1974, this Bureau [Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare: Social Security Administration] studied the
design and content of the form SSA-787 and one of its recommendations
was that the form should be modified to reduce its self-serving makeup,
particularly where conflict of interest situations may apply to institutional
doctors. Where item 7 of the form is concerned, other institutional
components, especially hospital administration, can usually supply the
required information if the doctor does not have it. Other revisions
undoubtedly will include expanded instructions to the physician
completing the form, especially about the impact of his opinion on the
rights of the beneficiary or patient involved.
Id. at 12.
31. Form SSA-787, supra note 29.
32. See Kennedy v. Secretary ("The only directly adverse opinion consisted of a
'no' box checked off by a state hospital psychiatrist on a Social Security form
inquiry [SSA-787], 'in your opinion, is the patient able to manage benefit payments
in his (her) own interests....'); see also Letter from James E. Forbus, supra note 30.
33. Form SSA-787, supra note 29.
34. See Kennedy v. Secretary; see also Letter from James E. Forbus, supra note 30.
35. See id.
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incapable of managing his/her own money." 36  It would be
helpful if this admonition were on the same page as the crucial
question to emphasize that the inquiry concerns basic needs and
the benefits contained in a monthly Social Security check and not
managing a substantial estate.37
If a patient lives in an environment with lots of elderly
people, where nurses distribute medication and check on
residents, that patient's physician might conclude that such
dependency mandates a medical finding that the beneficiary is
incapable of managing the proceeds of his or her own monthly
payment. Relying on such a statement skews the calculus. A
personal assessment by a Social Security representative would
be helpful, but this usually only occurs when the beneficiary
comes to the office. Generally, outreach in terms of going to
interview individuals where they reside is not an option; the cost
in terms of time and money is too high.38  Therefore, the
tendency would be to rely on the medical certificate
accompanied by the statements of the person applying to be a
representative payee. I am not referring to a venal applicant, but
one who sincerely believes that she could assist the relative or
friend by managing the benefits. However, the stated
presumption is that the beneficiary should receive the benefits
directly.39
As indicated previously, sending a notice indicating that
representative payment is planned is now a requirement.40
However, without more, this information might not reach the
36. Form SSA-787, supra note 29.
37. See id.
38. The United States Government Accountability Office has described long
waiting times at field offices. See Social Security Administration: Further Actions
Needed to Address Disability Claims and Service Delivery Challenges: Hearing Before the
Subcomms. on Income Security and Family Support and Social Security of the H. Comm.
on Ways and Means, 111th Cong. 2 (2009) (statement of Daniel Bertoni, Director
Education, Workforce, and Income Security).
39. Social Security Online Program Operations Manual System, Section GN
00502.010, https://secure.ssa.gov/appsl0/poms.nsf/Inx/0200502010!opendocument
(last visited Oct. 25, 2009).
40. 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(j)(2)(E)(ii) (Westlaw through 2009 Pub L. 111-62).
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intended recipient. Many facilities that house the elderly have
arrangements with family that business mail should be sent to
the relative rather than the resident in the facility. Therefore, the
notice from Social Security as to representative payment might
well be forwarded to the family member, possibly the very
person who applied to be a representative payee. There is no
requirement of certified mail, return receipt requested, or some
indication on the face of the envelope that the notice must be
delivered to the named beneficiary.41 Since direct deposit is
encouraged by the government for Social Security checks, 42 the
first word a beneficiary might receive that something is awry is
when the check is not deposited in her account.
SELECTION OF AN APPROPRIATE PAYEE
Who will be the representative payee? This is the question
facing the Social Security official once a determination has been
made that the beneficiary is incapable of managing the
benefits. 43 For the elderly, the choice is not always clear. The
easy course of action is to name the person who applied to be
the payee. Unfortunately, that might not be the correct choice.
(At one time, the choice of a particular person to be a
representative payee was not subject to full administrative
review.)44 As a federal district court noted in the mid 1970s:
"[T]he Secretary has now wisely expanded the scope of
pertinent regulations to include the particular choice of
representative payee as among those administrative actions
which do involve a right to eventual administrative hearing." 45
41. See id.
42. See Social Security Online, Direct Deposit Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/deposit/DDFAQ898.htm (last visited Sep. 14, 2009),
"Social Security strongly encourages all Social Security and SSI beneficiaries to
receive their monthly benefits by direct deposit. As of January 2007, 80 percent of
all Social Security and SSI beneficiaries received their benefits by direct deposit." Id.
43. 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(j)(1)-(2) (Westlaw through 2009 Pub L. 111-62).
44. See, e.g., McAuliffe v. Secretary, [1977 - 1978 Transfer Binder] Social
Security Matters, Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) 1 15, 116 (D. Conn. 1977).
45. Id.
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Congress now has mandated the right to an appeal and
hearing.46
For individuals living in a group environment, a frequent
applicant to be the representative payee might be the facility. If
the person is in state housing, a state official might be the
applicant. While the regulation indicates that these are not
preferred payees, they are eligible to serve.4 7 There are many
potential problems since these individuals are also creditors of
the beneficiary. The SSA recognizes that it is legitimate to apply
the monthly benefits for living expenses at the facility.48
"Current maintenance includes cost incurred in obtaining food,
shelter, clothing, medical care, and personal comfort items."4 9
How the benefits are allocated among these various items is left
to the sound discretion of the representative payee.50 When a
facility or a state official is the payee, there might be a tendency
to allocate a standard, small, amount for personal comfort items
or for other miscellaneous expenses, while using the rest for the
monthly bill. Not surprisingly, the focus would be to maximize
payment for the care provided.
Some states have been particularly aggressive in trying to
capture Social Security benefits of residents in state facilities.51 I
was involved in litigation in Connecticut thirty-five years ago
concerning the activities of the state commissioner of finance
and control.52 Using a special state statute, individuals in state
mental health facilities with limited assets were declared
incompetent, and the commissioner was named their
conservator.53  He then applied to become the representative
payee of all residents of various mental health facilities.54 The
46. 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(j)(2)(E)(i) (Westlaw through 2009 Pub L. 111-62).
47. 20 C.F.R § 404.2021(a) (2009).
48. 20 C.F.R §§ 404.2040(a)-(b) (2009).
49. 20 C.F.R § 404.2040(a).
50. See id.
51. See, e.g., McAuliffe v. Carlson, 377 F. Supp. 896 (D. Conn. 1974).
52. See id.
53. Id. at 898-99.
54. Id.
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federal district court found the statutory scheme
unconstitutional. 5  In a related case concerning the decision of
the SSA to designate the commissioner of finance and control as
the representative payee, the district court noted that "[tihere is
considerable force to the conflict-of-interest argument."56
Similar litigation ensued in Pennsylvania.57  Their comparable
statute was held unconstitutional,58 and the SSA indicated it
would abide by the decree.59 In Illinois, at about the same time,
the federal district court found both the state and federal
procedures unconstitutional in terms of representative payee
appointments.60 However, where Indiana followed appropriate
procedures in applying to be a representative payee for state
hospital residents, and was so appointed by the SSA, the court of
appeals upheld the awkward creditor situation, noting that the
"Social Security Act and regulations . . . permit-in fact,
encourage-state institutions to act as representative payees
and, more pertinently, when acting as payees, to apply
recipients' benefits to the cost of their care and maintenance at a
state institution where they reside." 61 (Occasionally, facilities
note that individual representative payees ignore the
maintenance bills for the beneficiary.6 2 Upon complaint to the
Social Security Administration, an evaluation of the suitability of
the payee can take place, and the facility could be named as
successor payee.)63
55. Id. at 905-06.
56. McAuliffe v. Secretary, No. 15, 494, [1977 - 1978 Transfer Binder] Social
Security Matters, Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) 1 15, 116 (D. Conn. 1977).
57. Vecchione v. Wohlgemuth, 426 F. Supp. 1297, 1300 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 558 F.2d
150 (3d Cir. 1977).
58. Vecchione, 426 F. Supp. at 1300.
59. Id. at 1302; see Social Security Online Program Operations Manual System,
Section GN 00502.160, https://secure.ssa.gov/appslO/poms.nsf/Inx/0200502160 (last
visited Oct. 25, 2009) (noting the Vecchione decision).
60. See Tidwell v. Schweiker, 677 F.2d 560, 564, 566 (7th Cir. 1982).
61. Mason v. Sybinski, 280 F.3d 788, 792-93 (7th Cir. 2002).
62. See the following three provisions in concert with one another: 20 CFR §§
404.2050(b), 404.2040(b), and 404.2021 (2009) (private or public institution where
person is housed as payee).
63. Id.
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POMS notes the problem of institutional representative
payees: "The appointment of an institution as payee requires
special handling because the institution is typically the
beneficiary's primary creditor."M The employee is admonished:
"Before you appoint an institution as payee, be sure there are no
qualified payees outside the institution who might better serve
the beneficiary's interests."6 5  However, the applicant is the
institution, and unless the family member is easy to locate and
contact, the likelihood is that the institution will become the
representative payee, at least in the interim. It is not that the
facility or state does not care about the beneficiary; it is that
there are divided loyalties. 66  Usually, a set amount will be
allocated for personal items for all residents who have payees
rather than any individualized assessment. The focus is
payment for the care and maintenance of the beneficiary in the
institution.67
JUDICIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
The subject of Social Security representative payment has drawn
increasing public and congressional attention during the last two
decades.6 8  The focus largely has been on instances of fraud
committed by representative payees.69  Unscrupulous persons
have diverted the monthly benefits for their own use rather than
for the care and maintenance of the beneficiaries.70 Testifying
before the Ways and Means Committee of the House of
Representatives, a Social Security official noted that the
64. Social Security Online Program Operations Manual System, Section GN
00502.160, supra note 59.
65. Id.
66. See id.
67. Id.
68. See Use of Representative Payees in the Social Security and Supplemental Security
Income Programs: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Social Security and Subcomm. on
Human Resources of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 101st Cong. 40 (1989); Social
Security Representative Payees: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Social Security of the H.
Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Cong. (2000).
69. See id.
70. Id.
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changing landscape of beneficiaries, with "the enactment of
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) in 1972, and demographic
and political changes in American society-such as the de-
institutionalization of the mentally ill, and the increase in
substance abusers," increased the necessity for representative
payment in more situations.'7 The percentage of beneficiaries
appointed representative payees has more than doubled since
1972, particularly for individuals with disabilities. 72 "Today,
these individuals are not institutionalized and often have no
close family willing or able to serve as payee."73
The search for an appropriate representative payee can be
time consuming. There was a time when the SSA cut off benefits
and permitted funds to accrue when it was determined that a
representative payee was required but none was currently
available.74 This could be a situation where there had been a
payee, but none presently, or when a person had just been
determined to require representative payment.75 In the late
1980's, beneficiaries filed a class action lawsuit in California to
address this situation.76  The SSA maintained that it could
suspend payment for ninety days (although the period often
seemed to be longer)," but the court of appeals found the impact
devastating: "Rent cannot be paid, and mentally disturbed
individuals take up 'life' on the streets. Food and necessities are
foregone, causing the precipitous declines in physical and
mental health which one might expect."78 Told to find payees,
individual beneficiaries "turn to potentially unreliable
characters," who in turn "abscond with the beneficiaries'
71. Social Security Representative Payees: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Social
Security of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Cong. 7 (2000) (statement of
Susan M. Daniels, Deputy Commissioner, Disability and Income Security
Programs).
72. See id.
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., Briggs v. Sullivan, 886 F.2d 1132, 1133 (9th Cir. 1989).
75. Id. at 1133-34.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1135.
78. Id. at 1136.
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money" or worse. 79  The prayer for relief was direct:
"temporarily paying the money directly to the beneficiaries,
even though they may have some serious disabilities
themselves."s0 The consequences could not be worse than what
was occurring.81 The Ninth Circuit directed the entry of an
injunction.8 2
The SSA did not appeal the entry of the injunction.83 After
the trial court ultimately found that certain procedures satisfied
due process, the court of appeals revisited the case.M "The
district court held that the Secretary has a duty to investigate
representative payees. The district court did not err in this
conclusion."8  The court noted that "investigation of the
suitability of representative payees was a significant
congressional concern" in a 1984 amendment. 86 However, the
court did not go further.8 7
Another recurrent problem during the 1980s concerned
accounting by representative payees for the benefits they
received on behalf of beneficiaries.8 8 In 1980, a federal district
court had certified a nationwide class of all disability recipients
and in 1983 had ordered "the Secretary to 'implement
appropriate mandatory periodic accounting procedures within
one year.'" 89 Social Security's compliance was limited.90 More
litigation ensued.91  Ultimately, the district court basically
reaffirmed its previous ruling.92 By the time the matter reached
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1148. The injunction did not include individuals whose SSI benefits
were based on alcohol or drug abuse. Id. at 1146 n.12.
83. Briggs v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 534, 536 (9th Cir. 1992).
84. Id. at 536, 539.
85. Id. at 537.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See, e.g., Jordan v. Bowen, 808 F.2d 733, 734 (10th Cir. 1987).
89. Id. at 734-35.
90. Id. at 735.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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the court of appeals once again, Congress had acted and
required a somewhat more limited accounting scheme that
exempted situations where the beneficiary and payee lived in
the same household,93 which the district court rejected. 9 4 (The
Secretary's attempt to appeal the district court order was
dismissed.)95
The twin problems of payee selection and accounting would
vex Social Security and invite congressional oversight through
the next twenty years. 96 The precipitating event that grabbed
public and congressional attention was the discovery of eight
bodies in the backyard of a boarding home operator in
Sacramento.97 Even though she previously had been convicted
of multiple counts of Social Security fraud, she had been
appointed representative payee of one of the victims. 9 8  This
September 1988 event led to hearings in June of 19899 and
legislation in 1990 to strengthen the representative payee
process.100
A face-to-face interview would be required "to the extent
practicable" for representative payees, identity would have to be
verified, prior Social Security crimes would be ascertained, and
prior payee service would be investigated. 0 1 Lists would be
maintained and circulated to field offices of those barred from
service. 102  In addition, funds were to be paid directly to
93. Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-460,
sec. 16(b), § 1631(a)(2)(C)(ii), 98 Stat. 1794 (1984).
94. Jordan, 808 F.2d at 735-36.
95. Id. at 736-37, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 925 (1987).
96. Social Security Representative Payees: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Social
Security of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Cong. 4, 16-18 (2000) (statement of
Susan M. Daniels, Deputy Commissioner, Disability and Income Security
Programs).
97. SSA's Representative Payee Program: Safeguarding Beneficiaries from Abuse:
Hearing Before the S. Spec. Comm. on Aging, 101st Cong. 2, 10 (1989).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1-2.
100. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, sec. 5105,
104 Stat. 1388-254 (1990).
101. Id. at sec. 5105(a)(2)(A)(i), § 205(j)(2)(A)-(B), 104 Stat. 1388-255-56 (1990).
102. Id.
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beneficiaries if no payee could be found within thirty days.103
Creditors would be limited in their ability to serve as payees, but
this did not extend to relatives, state facilities, or those whose
facilities are licensed by states or localities.0" The due process
protections instituted administratively after litigation in the
1970s were now written into the statute.05 Accounting would be
mandated and heightened scrutiny was to be given to high-risk
payees. 0 6 If SSA had been negligent in selection of a payee, the
beneficiary was to be reimbursed.10 7  Finally, organizational
payees could collect fees, 08 and the GAO would assess the
program and report back to Congress.'09 Even with the changes,
the consultant for the Administrative Conference of the United
States sharply criticized the nature of the representative payee
decision-making process for "neither safeguarding autonomy
nor providing beneficiaries the assistance they need."" 0
In 1995, the Commissioner of Social Security appointed a
fourteen-person Representative Payment Advisory Committee
to conduct research, hold hearings, and prepare a report on the
program."' In November 1996, the committee announced its
findings and presented a series of recommendations that
emphasized the autonomy of the individual and the need for
care in selecting payees.112 Three sentences of the final report
aptly describe the problem as observed by the committee:
"However, it is clear that SSA places a premium on speedy case
processing to get payments out quickly. Equal emphasis is not
given to the important decisions involved in representative
103. Id. at sec. 5105(a)(2)(A)(i), § 205(j)(2)(D)(ii)(I), 104 Stat. 1388-257 (1990).
104. Id. at sec. 5105(a)(2)(A)(i), § 205(j)(2)(C), 104 Stat. 1388-256-57 (1990).
105. Id. at sec. 5105(a)(2)(A)(i), § 205(j)(2)(E), 104 Stat. 1388-257.
106. Id. at sec. 5105(b)(2), 104 Stat. 1388-263-64 (1990).
107. Id. at sec. 5105(c)(1), § 205(j)(5), 104 Stat. 1388-265 (1990).
108. Id. at sec. 5105(a)(3)(A)(i), § 205(j)(4)(A), 104 Stat. 1388-260-61 (1990).
109. H.R. REP. No. 101-964, at 928-33 (1990) (Conf. Rep.)
110. Margaret G. Farrell, Administrative Paternalism: Social Security's
Representative Payment Program and Two Models of Justice, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 283,
298 (1992).
111. REPRESENTATIVE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM., Soc. SEC. ADMIN., FINAL
REPORT, vii (1996).
112. See id.
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payment. Capability decisions sometimes are handled
perfunctorily."1 13  While the Administration struggled to
implement the recommendations, the clash of funding, speed of
decision-making, and the difficulty in assessment of capacity
and finding payees seems to have slowed progress.114
By the new millennium, there still were calls for reform in
the representative payment process.' The Social Security
Protection Act of 2004 was a major effort by Congress to
improve representative payment."6  For the first time,
representative payees were made liable for misused funds and a
statutory scheme for recovery was established.117 Organization
payees now had to show bonding and licensing (if available in
that state),"1 s and Social Security must conduct periodic on-site
reviews." 9 The annual accounting is strengthened by requiring
payees to personally collect the checks at a field office if no
accounting is filed.120 If there is misuse of funds by payees,
checks must be reissued to the beneficiary.121 No longer is there
a finding of negligence necessary. 122 Finally, Congress directed a
one-time study of the representative payee program-this was
contracted out to the National Academies, which issued a
comprehensive report in late 2007.123 The study focused on the
selection of payees, both individuals and organizations, as well
113. REPRESENTATIVE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM., SOC. SEC. ADMIN., FINAL
REPORT, at viii.
114. See Social Security Representative Payees: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Social
Security of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Cong. 4 (2000).
115. See id. at 4, 16-18.
116. Social Security Protection Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-203, 118 Stat. 493
(2004).
117. Id. at sec. 105(a)(4), § 205(j)(7)(A), 118 Stat. 504 (2004).
118. Id. at sec. 102(a)(1)(D), § 205(j)(9), 118 Stat. 497 (2004).
119. Id. at sec. 102(b)(1), § 205(j)(6)(A), 118 Stat. 498 (2004).
120. Id. at sec. 106(a)(2), § 205(j)(3)(E), 118 Stat. 505 (2004).
121. Id. at sec. 101(b)(1), §§ 807(i)(A)-(B), 118 Stat. 495 (2004).
122. See id.
123. COMMITEE ON SOCIAL SECURITY REPRESENTATIVE PAYEES, NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, IMPROVING THE SOCIAL SECURITY REPRESENTATIVE PAYEE
PROGRAM: SERVING BENEFICIARIES AND MINIMIZING MISUSE 1 (National Academies
Press 2007).
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as the accounting process. 124 The systems in place were found to
be flawed and suggestions were made for improvements.125 It
will be interesting to see what steps, if any, Social Security takes
to modify the program.
124. Id. at 4-6.
125. See id.
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